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Introduction
Muammar Gaddafi's rule of Libya was characterized as eccentric, comical and brutal.1 Once
labeled as the ''mad dog of the Middle East'' by President Reagan, Colonel Gaddafi was one of the
longest serving world leaders when his regime collapsed.2 Hailing from a Bedouin background, and
ultimately becoming the 'King of Kings in Africa',  Gaddafi  experienced eight Presidents of the
United States, eight British Prime-Ministers and six Secretary-Generals of the United Nations in his
42 years in power. The longevity of Gaddafi's authoritarian regime is an exceptional case in the
history of world politics, although not that exceptional in the Middle Eastern context. As of 2010,
Libya's system of governance seemed to be as steadfast as other long-standing rulers in the Middle
East. Ali Abdullah Saleh had served as Yemen's president for 33 years, Hosni Mubarak had ruled
Egypt for three decades, the Assad dynasty had been in charge of Syria since 1970, and Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia for 23 years.3 
Street protests erupted in February 2011 in cities and towns across Libya.4 Within days, the
situation  escalated.  High  ranking  government  officials  and  diplomats  defected  and  unleashed
scathing condemnations of Gaddafi's violent response, while in the east, officers and soldiers alike
declared their loyalty to the Libyan people.5 During the Arab Spring, the authoritarian leaders of
Tunisia  and  Egypt  stepped  down after  weeks  of  street  protests.  Libya  did  not  follow suit  and
1 Charles Recknagel, “Gaddafi Deat Ends Four Decades of Brutality, Eccentric Excess,” Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty. October 20, 2011.  http://www.rferl.org/content/obituary_muammar_qaddafi/24304887.html
2 Ronald Reagan calls Colonel Gaddafi Mad Dog, YouTube video, 0:27, posted by “Iconic,” December 10, 2010, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dqn9Hwf-H0
3 Johnny West, “Karama!: Journeys Through the Arab Spring,” (London: Quercues 2011),  2.
4  Ian Black and Owen Bowcott “Libya Protests: Massacres Reported as Gaddafi Imposes News Blackout,” The 
Guardian. February 18, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/18/libya-protests-massacres-reported
5 Ian Black, “Libya: Defections Leave Muammar Gaddafi Isolated in Tripoli Bolthole,” The Guardian. February 23, 
2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/23/muammar-gaddafi-libya-tripoli-uprising; “Scores Defect 
from Gaddafi's Army,” Al Jazeera. May 31, 2011. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/05/20115308196965572.html
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Gaddafi fought to maintain his hold on power.6 
This  thesis  focuses  on  the  Gaddafi-regime's  response  to  the  protests.  How did  Gaddafi
almost regain power, following widespread civil unrest and the fracturing of the state, and which
role  did  the  use  of  informal  power  play  in  this?  Some scholars  argue  that  the  persistence  of
authoritarianism in the Middle East is rooted in the incompatibility between Islam and democracy.7
Other scholars provide a different view on the absence of democracy in the Middle East. Oliver
Schlumberger's  Debating  Arab  Authoritarianism:  Dynamics  and  Durability  in  Nondemocratic
Regimes is  divided  in  four  dimensions  that  are  relevant  in  understanding  the  durability  Arab
authoritarianism.8 This framework analyses the durability of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes
by focusing on state-society relations, features of the political regimes themselves, the position of
the armed forces in the economy and the regimes' relations with international community.9 Although
sharing a common authoritarian streak, the political regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya did not
share  the  same  characteristics  in  these  four  dimensions.  The  ideology  and  symbolism  that
legitimized the Libyan regime's  rule,  and the domestic and foreign policies that  shaped Libyan
state-society relations, as well as Libya's position in the international community, were all greatly
influenced by Gaddafi's dominance over the political process over the course of 42 years. 
This  thesis  puts  forth  the  hypothesis  that  shifts  Schlumberger's  four  dimensions  did
ultimately lead to the fall of Gaddafi's regime. The regime's international position is identified as a
dimension that accounts for its durability, and the NATO-intervention was essential in the fall of the
6 Maria Golovnina, “US Warns of Civil War in Libya Unless Gaddafi Goes,” Reuters. March 1, 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/01/us-libya-protests-idUSTRE71G0A620110301
7 Alon Ben-Meir, “Is Islam Compatible with Democracy,” Huffington Post. July 8, 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/is-islam-compatible-with_b_3562579.html
8 Oliver Schlumberger, ed. Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic Regimes 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
9 Oliver Schlumberger , “Arab Authoritarianism,” in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability of 
Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 10. 
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regime.10 In this way, the framework supports the course of events in Libya. What this thesis shall
argue however, is that Gaddafi's use of informal power was an essential element in the regime's
initial  survival,  and,  militarily speaking,  near-victory over rebel  forces.  The second part  of this
argument is that this use of informal power led to the regime's demise. This thesis shall take Libya's
uprising as a case-study to determine the importance of the a regime's ability and willingness to use
forms of informal power in times of crisis. This would add to Schlumberger's framework that the
use of informal power by a regime can strengthen its durability, but that the international position of
a regime that uses informal power in times of crisis, can also constitute a critical factor its downfall.
1. Methodology
Gaddafi's response to internal upheaval during the Arab Spring is a case-study, whereby the
Libyan regime's response to social  unrest and its  durability is  held against  Schlumberger's  four
dimensions that account for the durability of Arab authoritarian regimes. The case of Libya can
provide an insight into the dual effect of the use of informal power. It can add to Schlumberger's
theoretical framework, to show that the use of informal power strengthens an Arab authoritarian
regime's durability, while the fall of the Gaddafi-regime can also be used to argue that, in certain
circumstances, the use of informal power can lead to the fall of an Arab authoritarian regime. This
dual effect of the use of informal power is underrepresented in Schlumberger's framework on the
durability of Arab authoritarianism.
Elements of a Political Personality Profile of Muammar Gaddafi can explain to what extent
his political behavior was driven by psychological forces.11 A Political Personality Profile analyses
10 Erica D. Borghard and Constantino Pischedda. “Allies and Airpower in Libya,” Parameters Spring (2012): 64, 
accessed November 13, 2014.
11 Jerrold M. Post, “Political Personality Profiling”, in:  Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist 
Guide, eds. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 131.
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appearance, speech, language, intelligence, evaluation of reality and ego defenses.12 It can provide
an insight into which imagery and symbolism Gaddafi  wished to project  and how his political
behavior effected the course of events. Previous instances of Gaddafi's political behavior will also
be  included,  to  show how Gaddafi's  personal  actions  influenced Libya's  interaction  with  other
states. Sources that interacted with Gaddafi will provide the basis for these arguments. This method
is a tool to establish the extent of Gaddafi's personal influence in dealing with the unrest, which is
an element of the use of informal power. 
This thesis uses both primary and secondary sources. These include the works of scholars
and eyewitness accounts. Furthermore, this thesis uses televised news reports and amateur footage.
These  are  used  to  provide  a  description  of  events  so  they  can  be  placed  in  Schlumberger's
framework.
2. Theoretical Framework
This thesis will combine both realist and constructivist perspectives of international relations
in providing an explanation for which motives lay behind the military intervention in Libya. Some
scholars, among them Marsh, state that the military intervention is best explained from a realist
perspective, whereby the involved states intervened to further and protect their interests.13 Other
scholars,  such  as  Davidson,  stress  the  importance  of  combining  realism,  constructivism  and
liberalism, to explain the military intervention. It integrates the role of international norms, threats
to national  interests,  prestige,  and the  minimization  of  electoral  risk,  as  factors  that  led to  the
12   Post, “Political Personality Profiling”, 138.
13 Kevin Marsh, “Leading from Behind: Neoclassical Realism and Operation Odyssey Dawn,” Defense & Security 
Analysis 30:2 (2014): 121, accessed January 15, 2015.
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intervention.14 
This thesis does not set out to define the most adequate model for the analysis of the NATO-
led intervention. Rather, the focus of this thesis is on the Libyan regime's response to the civil
unrest,  which  caused  the  international  community  to  intervene.  Both  perspectives  can  be
complementary to each other, as they can be used to assess whether Gaddafi's use of informal power
effected the durability of Libya's authoritarian regime.
3. Conceptual Framework
Oliver  Schlumberger's  Debating  Arab  Authoritarianism:  Dynamics  and  Durability  in
Nondemocratic  Regimes provides  four  dimensions  that  are  relevant  in  understanding  Arab
authoritarianism. The first dimension, state-society relations and political opposition, is laid out by
Heydemann.  This  covers  the  national-populist  social  pacts  that  have  structured  state-society
relations in the Middle East and account for the durability of Arab authoritarian regimes, as opposed
to  its  coercive  capacity.  Heydemann argues  that  the  durability  of  Middle  Eastern  authoritarian
regimes is determined by the adaptability and flexibility of national-populist social pacts.15 
The second dimension relates to the features of the political regimes themselves. It concerns
the political architecture, the constellation of forces within regimes and their specific strategies of
power  maintenance.16 It  also  covers  the  repressive  capacities,  the  degrees  of  non-democratic
legitimacy through symbol politics, patronage systems and control of the rules of the political and
14 Jason W. Davidson, “Britain, France and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis,” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 26:2 (2013), 312, accessed January 7, 2015.
15 Steven Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism,” in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: 
Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007), 26. 
16   Schlumberger , “Arab Authoritarianism,” 11.
8      Iwema – s0856649
economic games.17 According to Schlumberger, sources of nondemocratic legitimacy are religion,
ideology,  and  the  extent  to  which  material  welfare  is  perceived  by  the  population.18 Sluglett
describes the weakness of Arab authoritarian states, how they maintained power, and what role the
make-up of society played in this. It relates to an absence of a middle class that engages in politics
to enhance their interests and a general lack of political participation.19 It further lays out the role of
democratic  rituals  for  legitimizing  the  authoritarian  regime,  citing  that  the  Soviet  Union  and
Saddam's Iraq used democratic rituals to legitimize the rule of these regimes.20 Lawson focuses on
the regime's key actors, namely private property holders, state officials and the military. The degree
to which an economy is institutionalized, and the extent of the corporate autonomy of the armed
forces, influences the dynamics of political reform and authoritarian rule.21 An important concept in
the  Libyan  context  of  this  dimension  is  informal  power.  Paoletti  argues  that  the  Libyan  state
consisted  of  four  power  structures,  namely,  the  formal  state  structure,  and the  informal  power
structures of Gaddafi and his family, the inner circle of the regime and tribal allegiances.22
The  coercive  power  of  states  is  an  important  factor,  which  has  to  be  included  in  this
framework.  Eva  Bellin's  contribution  to  Authoritarianism  in  the  Middle  East:  Regimes  and
Resistance describes the coercive capacity of Middle Eastern states and which factors contribute to
the  degree  of  coercive  power.  These  are:  revenues  of  natural  resources,  persistent  support  of
17  Ibidem.
18 Oliver Schlumberger “Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle 
East,” Middle East Critique 19:3 (2010), 237-238, accessed December 12, 2014.
19 Peter Sluglett, “The Ozymandias Syndrome: Questioning the Stability of Middle Eastern Regimes,” in Debating 
Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 99. 
20   Sluglett, “The Ozymandias Syndrome,” 102.
21 Fred H. Lawson, “Intraregime Dynamics, Uncertainty and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Arab World,” 
in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 110.
22 Emanuel Paoletti, “Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict,” Mediterranean Affairs 16 no. 2 (2011): 316, accessed 
November 28, 2014.
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international patrons, the patrimonial character of state institutions and the limited degree of popular
mobilization for democratic reform.23 Heydemann's later work on the coercive power of Syria's
authoritarian regime in dealing with its civil unrest, provides an insight into the durability of the
Libyan regime during the Arab Spring. According to Heydemann, the Syrian regime's durability
hinged on its ability to restructure its security forces and adapt its security tactics, in order to deal
with large-scale civil unrest and the ensuing armed insurrection.24
The third dimension covers the economic context of Arab authoritarianism. Droz-Vincent
analyzes the role of the military in Middle Eastern economies and how this strengthens the ruling
regimes. The durability of an Arab authoritarian regime depends on the manner in which the army is
autonomous from the regime in its economic activity, its internal management, and the extent to
which the army exerts influence on the political system.25
The fourth dimension of this conceptual framework relates to Arab authoritarianism in the
context of the international community. Sayyid explains how certain factors, especially the lack of
commitment to  democracy-promotion by G8 members,  created an overall  international  political
environment  that  is  fundamentally  inhospitable  to  political  change  in  the  Middle  East.26 The
international dimension that relates to the coercive capacities of Middle Eastern states is described
by Brownlee. According to him, Middle Eastern regimes have been able to use force without being
restrained by foreign pressure to respect human rights or enable democratization.27 
23 Eva Bellin “Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders.” in Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and 
Resistance, ed. Marsha P. Posusney and Michele P. Angrist (London: Lynne Riennr Publishers 2005), 21.
24 Steven Heydemann “Syria's Adaptive Authoritarianism,” Project on Middle East Political Science. February 12, 
2014. http://pomeps.org/2014/02/12/syrias-adaptive-authoritarianism/
25 Philippe Droz-Vincent, “From Political to Economic Actors: The Changing Roles of Middle Eastern Armies” in 
Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 199-203.
26 Mustapha K. Sayyid, “The International Dimension of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism: the G8 and External 
Efforts at Political Reform,” in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic 
Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007),  218.
27 Jason Brownlee “Political Crisis and Restabilization: Iraq, Libya, Tunisia and Syria.” in Authoritarianism in the 
Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, ed. Marsha P. Posusney and Michele P. Angrist (London: Lynne Riennr 
Publishers 2005), 43.
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The  case  of  Libya  will  be  set  against  Schlumberger's  framework  with,  among  others,
Kawzcynski, Lacher, Meredith, Taylor and Vandewalle, providing the Libyan context. Firstly, the
pre-Arab  Spring  Libyan  system  of  governance  shall  be  analyzed  through  Schlumberger's
framework. This shall provide an insight into what extent the Libyan regime's durability can be
accounted for through this framework. The coercive power of the regime shall be analyzed through
Bellin and Heydemann their work on the forms of resistance and government responses. Secondly,
this thesis shall analyze the shifts that occurred in Schlumberger's four dimensions in Libya during
the Arab Spring.  Thirdly,  an argument shall be made to what extent the use of informal power
secured a near-total military victory over rebel forces. Lastly, an analysis shall be provided of the
extent to which the arguments that legitimized the NATO-led military intervention were based on
this use of informal power by the Gaddafi-regime. 
4. Libyan State-Society Relations and Political Opposition
The  interaction  between  the  state  and  the  people  and  between  the  state  and  political
opposition, determine the formal and informal arrangements that exist between these parties, as well
as the organization of the political system, according to Heydemann.28 Heydemann argues that the
adaptability  and  flexibility  of  national-populist  social  pacts,  consisting  of  formal  and  informal
modes  of  governance,  determines  the  durability  of  Middle  Eastern  authoritarian  regimes.29 In
Heydemann's  model,  formal  institutions  provide  the  means  to  manage  mass  politics,  but  also
constrain the regime to a certain extent to a formal set of rules, while this model also consolidates
informal  governance.30 Heydemann  goes  further  by  describing  the  challenges  to  the  national-
28 Schlumberger , “Arab Authoritarianism,” 10.
29  Heydemann, “Social Pacts,” 26.
30  Ibid., 27.
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populist  social  pacts,  namely that  the level  of political  participation broadens,  or  that  so many
people choose to work through informal rules outside of the state's control, that the authoritarian
regime becomes marginalized.31 
The Libyan political system had no institutionalized political parties or political opposition.
Gaddafi's  Green  Book specifies  that  parliaments  in  modern  traditional  democracies  are
undemocratic,  that  political  parties  are  dictatorial  instruments  of  power  and  that  political
oppositions have a negative impact on societies due to them undermining the ruling government.32
The  absence  of  institutionalized  political  opposition  parties  meant  that  Libya  had  no
institutionalized space for political contestation. To this end, an analysis of the features of the Great
Socialist  People's  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya,  Schlumberger's  second dimension,  shall  provide  an
insight  into  the  relation  between  formal  and  informal  arrangements,  structures  of  resource
allocation, legitimacy and governance, and political and social organization of society.
5. Features of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
The features of the political regimes concern the political architecture, the constellation of
forces  within regimes and their  strategies  of  maintaining power.33 It  also covers  the  repressive
capacities, the degrees of nondemocratic legitimacy through symbol politics, patrimonial networks,
and control of the rules of the political and economic games.34 An analysis of these elements can
provide an explanation for the durability of Gaddafi's system of governance through the relation
31  Ibid., 37.
32 Gathafi The Green Book, 6-9.
33   Schlumberger , “Arab Authoritarianism,” 11.
34 Ibid.
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between formal and informal power arrangements. 
After  the  bloodless  coup  of  1969,  the  new  constitution  formalized  the  Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC), consisting of military officers and headed by Gaddafi, as Libya's highest
political authority.35 The RCC appointed the Council of Minister, and the RCC-members directly
ran every ministry, apart from the Ministry of Oil.36 In 1971, Gaddafi's speech in Zawiya laid out a
vision of 'popular rule', whereby local, provincial and national assemblies took place in order to
reduce the power of traditional identities and institutions, while banning all political activity outside
this framework.37 Fifteen of the seventeen ministries were turned over to civilians, diminishing the
political power and ability to set up patronage networks of RCC-members, apart from Gaddafi. 38
Sluglett states that an absence of a middle class that engages in politics to enhance their interests,
and  a  general  lack  of  political  participation  are  important  factors  in  the  durability  of  Arab
authoritarianism.39 The new Libyan system supposedly enhanced the political participation of the
population.  However,  Gaddafi's  revolutionary  experiment  was  abandoned  by  a  lack  of
participation.40 This may seem to constitute a failure, but it was the beginning of a division between
the formal and informal political power structures.41 
Gaddafi's speech in Zuwara in April 1973 launched the Popular Revolution.42 This upheaval
in the political system entailed the removal of existing political, legal and administrative structures,
the removal of bureaucrats deemed hostile towards revolutionary change, the purge of former elites
35 Dirk Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 81.
36 Ibid.
37   Ibid., 82. 
38 Ibid., 83. 
39 Sluglett, “The Ozymandias Syndrome,” 99.
40 Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 82. 
41   Ibid., 84. 
42   Ibid., 83. 
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in the media, government and universities, while popular committees were established in all public
and community organizations.43
The first installment of the  Green Book was published in 1975.44 It laid the economic and
political organization of society.45 The system of governance it contained, was that local congresses
chose district-level working committees, that together formed the General People's Congress, the
highest formal institutional power.46 The Green Book replaced Sharia law, while unions, sport clubs
and  professional  associations  and  other  forms  of  organizations  were  banned.47 Any  existing
structure  or  grassroots  organization  outside  the  official  framework  was  removed  from society.
Gaddafi stated that it was a system that promised bottom-up power to the people, but in reality, it
cemented Gaddafi's top-down domination over every aspect of political life in Libya.48 Ronald st
John describes how the ideology of the Green Book was vague and depended on how the 'Brotherly
Leader'  explained  it,  which  differed  from place  and  time,  which  is  an  indication  of  Gaddafi's
personal influence over the political process.49 Control over the budget, police, army, foreign policy
and oil sector was placed outside the formal power structure of the General People's Congress.50
Sluglett  stresses  the  importance  of  democratic  rituals  for  legitimizing  the  authoritarian
regime.51 In theory,  the General People's Congress was an elected legislative body. The Libyan
system supposedly was the most democratic form of governance, as it removed all barriers between
43 Daniel Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi: Libya, the West and the 'Arab spring (London: Biteback Publishing, 2011), 
22-23.
44   Ibid.
45 Gathafi, M. (2005). The green book. Reading: Ithaca Press.
46 Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 27.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ronald Bruce st John, “The Ideology of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi: Theory and Practice,“ International. Journal of 
Middle East Studies 15 (1983): 472, accessed June 15, 2014.
50   Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 104; Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 27.
51 Sluglett, “The Ozymandias Syndrome,” 102.
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the population and the state.52 Lawson focuses on the key actors of the regime, namely private
property  holders,  state  officials  and  the  military.  The  degree  to  which  an  economy  is
institutionalized  and  the  extent  of  the  corporate  autonomy of  the  armed  forces,  influences  the
dynamics of political reform and authoritarian rule.53 The implementation of the directives of the
Green Book saw the private sector disappear, with all revenues of oil exports set outside the control
of the General People's Congress, this way greatly increased the regime's ability to set up patronage
networks.54 The corporate autonomy of the armed forces was non-existent, as control of all resource
revenues and security forces lay within the informal power structure. 
This  system  where  the  interaction  between  formal  and  informal  power  structures
strengthened the authoritarian regime, was solidified in 1977 with the establishment of the  Great
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.55 In 1979, Gaddafi resigned from the General People's
Congress,  enabling  him  to  sit  above  the  formal  power  structure  by  separating  formal  and
revolutionary authority,  and to blame the formal power structure for any failure.56 According to
Vandewalle, Gaddafi removed himself from the formal power structure, but still made all important
decisions  and  retained  all  power  within  a  small  elite.57 The  RCC-members  all  came from less
prestigious  tribes.58 Since  an unsuccessful  coup of  1975,  the amount  of  Gaddafi's  tribesmen in
security  and  army  positions  increased.59 In  this  way,  tribal  loyalties  were  instrumental  in
maintaining Gaddafi's system 
52 Gathafi, The Green Book, 16.
53   Lawson, “Intraregime Dynamics,” 116.
54   Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 104-107.
55   Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 27.
56   Ibid, 31.
57   Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 121.
58 Ibid., 78.
59 Ibid., 100.
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In  his  forty-two  year  rule,  Gaddafi  sought  to  legitimize  his  position  as  'Guide  of  the
Revolution'.  Schlumberger  states  that  religion,  ideology  and  material  welfare  are  sources  of
nondemocratic legitimacy.60 Gaddafi possessed no religious authority, nor was his tribal background
rooted in the traditional power structures.61 Apart from ideology, namely the Green Book's definition
of democratic participation, the separation of formal and informal power structures granted Gaddafi
various forms of nondemocratic legitimacy. Control of Libya's oil-revenues lay outside the formal
power structure. With Gaddafi as Libya's central patron, Brownlee asserts that the people had no
incentive  for  collective  action  against  the  regime,  as  long as  the  oil-revenues  were  distributed
among the population, which constitutes nondemocratic legitimacy through material welfare.62 The
economy being placed outside of the formal state structure, excluded alternative forms of economic
patronage networks. These revenues furthermore contribute to the degree of coercive power of Arab
authoritarian regimes, according to Eva Bellin.63 With control of these revenues placed outside the
formal state structure of the General People's Congress, Gaddafi had firmly rooted the coercive
power in the informal power structure. Other factors that relate to the coercive power of the state
are: the persistent support of international patrons, the patrimonial character of state institutions and
the limited degree of popular mobilization for democratic reform.64 In all these aspects, Gaddafi's
system of governance maintained control of the coercive power of the state in the informal power
structure. Libya's formal state institutions were of no threat to the informal power structure, as the
oil-revenues and security services were controlled outside the formal power structure of the General
People's Congress. The absence of legal political opposition parties and virtually every other form
of grassroots organizations, meant that the degree of popular mobilization was limited and of little
60 Schlumberger, “Opening Old Bottles” 237-238.
61 Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 78.
62 Brownlee, “Political Crisis,” 56.
63 Bellin “Coercive Institutions.” 21.
64 Ibid.
16      Iwema – s0856649
threat to the regime.
6. The Libyan Military and the Economy
Droz-Vincent describes the role of the military in Middle Eastern economies and how this
strengthens the authoritarian regimes. The autonomy of the army in its economic activities, in its
internal management, and the extent to which the army exerts influence on the political system,
determine the durability of Arab authoritarianism.65 The military becomes the backbone of Arab
authoritarian  regimes,  due  to  its  monopoly  on  the  use  of  force,  and  its  economic  and  social
functions, as a result from it being allocated a large portion of the state budget and the expansion of
the military into the civilian economic sector.66 The link with the durability of Arab authoritarian
regimes  lies  in  the  officer  corps  becoming  part  of  the  elite  and  exerting  control  over  defense
budgets, combined with the rank-and-file achieving financial security and enjoying privileges.67  In
this way, the armed forces have little to gain from regime-change or a process of democratization
that would alter the economic activities and societal position of the military.
The argument of the armed forces of the backbone of Gaddafi's regime is undermined by the
notion that Gaddafi, according to Salama, kept the regular military forces weak so they could not
topple him.68 Gurdon and Schuler confirm the idea that Gaddafi deliberately kept the regular armed
forces  weak,  while  militias  and units  commanded  by direct  relatives  were  relatively  strong  to
65 Droz-Vincent, “From Political to Economic Actors,” 199-203.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid, 203-204.
68 Viviana Salama, “Qaddafi Military Spending Below Sweden, leaves Authority Gap,” Bloomberg. March 2, 2011 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-01/qaddafi-military-spending-below-sweden-s-leaves-authority-
gap
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counteract the potential threat of the military.69 Also, the Libyan regular forces were organized in
smaller units than in other Arab states, had less officers, little training and deliberately did not have
an effective organizational structure.70 Droz-Vincent cites the economic activities of the military and
its  access  to  oil-revenues  as  elements  that  strengthen  the  durability  of  Arab authoritarianism.71
According to  Taylor,  this  was not  the case in  Libya,  where the regular  armed forces  had little
influence over the defense budget nor a strong economic position.72 The great amount of military
spending by Libya  seems incompatible  with  this.  However,  buying large  quantities  of  military
hardware can act as a deterrent against foreign powers, while inadequate distribution of military
equipment among regular armed forces and insufficient training, maintains the regular military as a
weak institution,  and diminishes  its  threat  to  the regime.  Some estimates  state  that  the Libyan
military  only  had  around  a  quarter  of  the  personnel  available  needed  to  operate  the  military
hardware it possessed.73 The poor performance of Libyan regular armed forces in its engagements
with Israel (1973),  Egypt (1977), Chad (1978-1987), Tanzania (1978-1979) and the United States
(1981, 1986 and 1989) confirms the characterization of the Libyan regular armed forces as a weak
fighting force.74
In the Libyan case, the regular armed forces played an insignificant role in the economic
arena. Rather, the organization of the security forces outside the formal state structure, and tribal
allegiances were the pillars on which the durability of the Libyan authoritarian regime depended.
69 “Gaddafi's Survival Means Weak Army, Co-Opted tribes,” Today's Zaman. February 25, 2011. 
http://www.todayszaman.com/world_gaddafi-survival-means-weak-army-co-opted-tribes_236612.html
70 William C. Taylor “Arab Uprisings and Civil-Military Relations: An Analysis of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria,” 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2014), 163.
71  Droz-Vincent, “From Political to Economic Actors,” 199.
72  Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 162.
73  Ibid. 168.
74  Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 86; Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 168.
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7. Libya's International Relations
Libya's international relations underwent many changes during Gaddafi's 42-year rule. As
the Revolutionary Command Council took power Kawczynski and Vandewalle claim that the RCC's
ideology,  namely  the  pan-Arab  nationalist  agenda  and  the  regime's  anti-Western  stance,  were
sources  of  nondemocratic  legitimacy.75 The  pan-Arab  nationalist  agenda  manifested  itself  in
proposed unions with Tunisia in 1974, Algeria in 1975, Syria in 1980 and Morocco in 1984, which
all constituted varying degrees of failure.76 Gaddafi's personal influence on the Libyan system of
governance,  in  combination  with  his  erratic  behavior,  resulted  in  contradictory  policies  that
diminished the chances of success of any collaboration with other nation-states. In 1973, Gaddafi
called upon the Egyptian people to implement a Libyan-style revolution, as the proposed unification
process stalled.77 Later that year, Israel had shot down a Libyan passenger plane that had strayed
into Israeli airspace along the Egyptian border. Gaddafi ordered an Egyptian submarine, that was
based  in  Libya,  to  attack  the  Queen  Elizabeth  II  in  the  Mediterranean  on  its  way  to  Israel.78
President  Sadat  stopped  this  plan  before  it  was  carried  out.79 Relations  deteriorated,  which
culminated in a month-long border war with Egypt in 1977.80 President Sadat remarked that Gaddafi
was  one  hundred  percent  sick.81 President  Numeiry  of  Sudan,  who  had  similar  dealings  with
75  Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 85;  Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 22.
76  Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 69-72.
77 Ibid., 66.
78  Uzi Mahnaimi “Desire for revenge Drove Gaddafi to Order Sinking of QE2,” The Sunday Times. March 6, 2011. 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/libya/article570628.ece
79  Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 66.
80  Ibid., 67.
81  Ibid.
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Gaddafi, stated that he suffered from a split personality, both evil.82
During the 1970's and 1980's, Gaddafi provided financial, material and logistical support to
non-state actors, among others, Abu Nidal, Carlos the Jackal, the Rote Armee Faktion, the Black
Panthers, the Nation of Islam, the Irish Republican Army, Charles Taylor's NPFL, Foday Sankoh's
RUF and Polisario.83 Kawczynski defines Gaddafi's support for these groups, which he personally
oversaw, as 'random and ill-informed'.84 Libya's actions on the international stage caused it to be
placed  on  the  list  of  state-sponsors  of  terror  by  the  United  States  in  1979.85 Apart  from this
entanglement  in  foreign  conflicts  and  terrorist  networks,  some  specific  instances  of  terrorism
defined Libya's international position for the years to come. In 1986, the La Belle discotheque in
West-Berlin, which was frequented by American serviceman, was bombed, with involvement of the
Libyan Embassy in East-Berlin.86 President Reagan characterized Gaddafi as 'the mad dog of the
Middle  East'  in  a  televised  speech  after  the  terrorist  attack.87 The  United  States  responded  by
bombing Tripoli and Benghazi, targeting Gaddafi's residence, the Bab al-Aziziya complex in an
apparent attempt on Gaddafi himself.88 Another instance of Libyan state-sponsored terrorism was
the  bombing  of  a  Pan-American  Airlines  passenger  plane  in  1988  over  Lockerbie,  Scotland.89
Gaddafi's rhetoric and foreign policy adventures had already strained relations with the West. Now,
82 Martin Meredith, “The State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence,” (LondonL Simon & 
Schuster, 2005), 351.
83 Robert Fisk, The great war for civilization: The conquest of the Middle East (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), 
1089; Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 38; Meredith, “The State of Africa,” 351; Charles M. Waugh, “Charles Taylor
and Liberia,” (London/New York: Zed Books, 2011), 115.
84  Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 35.
85 “Libya (03/09),” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/libya/120759.htm
86 Fisk, The great war for civilization, 1090.
87 Ronald Reagan calls Colonel Gaddafi Mad Dog, YouTube video, 0:27, posted by “Iconic,” December 10, 2010, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dqn9Hwf-H0
88 Ibid., 1093.
89 Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 105
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the West imposed crippling economic sanctions on Libya.90 
Gaddafi's  unsuccessful  attempts  to  achieve  Arab  unity  diminished  Gaddafi's  sources  of
nondemocratic legitimacy. Economic problems due to sanctions, removed Libya's oil wealth and
material welfare, as a source of legitimacy. In the 1990's, Gaddafi refrained from supporting anti-
Western non-state actors,  in a bid to ease economic sanctions and establish ties with the West,
although this removed his anti-Western stance as a source of nondemocratic legitimacy. During this
time,  Gaddafi  focused  on  Libyan  relations  with  African  states,  and  implemented  efforts  to
strengthen the position of Africa as a power-block. Gaddafi did this in order to break Libya free
from its isolated position, and to establish himself as a leader in Africa, thereby creating a source of
nondemocratic legitimacy.91 Gaddafi had not lost his sense of grandiosity. In 1999, he called for the
establishment of the United States of Africa at an Extraordinary Session of the Organization of
African Unity in Sirte.92 In 2008, he gathered two hundred African kings and traditional leaders to
crown him as the 'King of Kings', a clear example of trying to create a source of nondemocratic
legitimacy.93 Libya improved relations with the West by extraditing two suspects of the Lockerbie-
bombing in 1999, and accepting responsibility in 2003.94 
According  to  Brownlee,  an  explanation  for  the  durability  of  Arab  authoritarianism  is
strengthened by the ability of Middle Eastern regimes to use force, without being restrained by
foreign pressure to respect human rights or enable democratization.95 Sayyid argues that the lack of
commitment to democracy-promotion by G8 members, has hampered political change in the Middle
90 “Timeline: Libya Sanctions,” BBC. October 15, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3336423.stm
91 Meredith, “The State of Africa,” 680.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 681.
94 Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 178-179.
95 Jason Brownlee, “Political Crisis,” 43.
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East.96 This may have been the case before the Arab Spring, but it does not account for shifts in the
international relations-dimension of Schlumberger's framework during the uprising.
 Libya had its share of problems with Islamic fundamentalism in the 1990's. Following a
crackdown on Islamist elements, many Libyans fled to Afghanistan, where members of the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group joined Al-Qaeda.97 Post-9/11,  this  convergence of  interests  between the
West and Gaddafi resulted in a close cooperation between Libyan and Western intelligence services
that lasted until the Arab Spring.98 
In 2003, Gaddafi made a move to further normalize relations with the West by dismantling
Libya's Weapons of Mass Destruction program.99 This was however, a choice of necessity. Libya's
economy was hit hard by the sanctions that were imposed by the UN Security Council after the
Lockerbie incident, combined with a decrease in oil-revenues.100 The expensive WMD program was
not  expected  to  be  successful  to  the  point  where  continuing it  would  reap  more  benefits  than
shutting it down.101 From this point on, Gaddafi banked on improving relations with the West, and
the economic and security-related benefits this brought with it to maintain his regime. 
96  Sayyid, “The International Dmension of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism ,” 217.
97  “The Libyan Islamic fighting Group – From Al Qaeda to the Arab Spring,” The Guardian. September 5, 2011. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/05/libyan-islamic-fighting-group-leaders
98  “Cooperation Between British Spies and Gaddafi's Libya Revealed in Official Papers,” The Guardian. January 22, 
2015. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/22/cooperation-british-spies-gaddafi-libya-revealed-official-
papers
99 William Toby, “A Message from Tripoli: How Libya Gave Up its WMD,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. March 
12, 2014 http://thebulletin.org/messag-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7834
100 Youssef M. Sawani,  in: Ricardo Laremont ed. Revolution, Reform and Revolt in North Africa: The Arab Spring 
and Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2014), 84
101  Sharon Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” April 22, 2004. CRS 
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8. The Uprising Begins.
Few foresaw that the death of one fruit vendor in Tunisia would set of a chain reaction
throughout  the  Middle  East,  shaking  the  foundations  of  the  ruling  authoritarian  regimes.
Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire on the 17 th of December 2010, after he was mistreated by
the authorities.102 The tale of corruption, injustice and abuse of power reverberated around the Arab
world. 
In Tunisia, president Ben Ali stepped down from power and fled to Saudi Arabia on the 14 th
of January.103 The day after, Muammar Gaddafi gave a televised statement in which he denounced
the overthrow of the Ben Ali.104 Gaddafi blamed foreign involvement as being the source of the
unrest,  and he legitimized his own rule by using rhetoric from his  Green Book.  The Wikileaks
disclosures on the Tunisian regime's corruption were branded as a foreign plot to create chaos, and
Gaddafi legitimized his own rule by urging Tunisia to implement Libya's system of governance,
claiming that the Great Libyan Arab Socialist Peoples Jamahiriya possessed the most democratic
form of governance.105
Human rights lawyer Fathi Terbil arrested in Benghazi on the 15 th of February, after which a
few hundred protesters demanded his release.106 The next day, thousands more were on the streets of
Benghazi chanting for the downfall of the regime.107 The regime responded by releasing Terbil and
102  Mark Fischer, “In Tunisia, Act of One Fruit Vendor Sparks Wave of Revolution Through Arab World,“ The 
Washington Post. March 26, 2011.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-
sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html
103  “Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced to Flee as protesters Claim Victory,” The Guardian. January 14, 2011.  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests
104  “Muammar Gaddafi Condemns Tunisian Uprising,” The Guardian. January 16, 2011.   
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising
105  Ibid.
106  First Demonstration in Benghazi 15-02-2011 لوأ ةرهاظم يف يزاغنب , YouTube video, 2:40, posted by “banghazino,” 
February 15, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Plg35PDS2Rw  
107  Jamal abdAlnaser street in downtwon Bengahzi 16- 2 -2011 تارهاظم يزاغنب  -ايبيل  , YouTube video, 6:10, posted by 
“Libico84,” February 16, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gzQy_wrV4VU
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several jailed Islamists, while blaming the West for the unrest.108 On the 16th, the Gaddafi regime
employed its  coercive power by using force against the protesters. Footage,  supposedly shot in
Benghazi, shows regular police forces on the streets with pro-Gaddafi demonstrators carrying sticks
and wearing yellow construction hats.109 This is not just the use of security forces, control of which
rests outside the formal state structure, yet still are part of official institutions. The use of armed
loyalist  counter-protesters  constitutes  the  use  of  informal  power,  through  the  mobilization  of
regime-supporters in  an unofficial  capacity.  According to  Taylor,  Gaddafi  had already flown in
mercenaries  from  neighboring  African  states  to  counter  potential  instability  within  the  armed
forces.110
The 'Day of Rage' on the 17th of February, that was called for on social media, saw violence
flare up across Libya. Tens of thousands of protesters flooded the streets in Benghazi, Derna and Al-
Bayda in the east,  and Zintan, in the West.111 In Al-Bayda, protests turned into violence. In the
eastern city of Derna, protesters threw rocks at police forces, who responded with gunfire.112 These
developments  constitute  a  major  shift  in  state-society  relations,  the  first  dimension  of
Schlumberger's  framework.  Crowds besieged Benghazi's  main  military  barracks,  where soldiers
opened fire.113 Videos allegedly shot on this day, show groups of 'yellow hat mercenaries,' wearing
green  scarfs  to  identify  themselves  as  Gaddafi-loyalists,  engaged  in  running  battles  with
108  Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 148.
109  يزاغنب تاعبقلا ءارفصلا 16 2 11  Benghazi Yellow Hats Mercenaries, YouTube video, 5:28, posted by “freeeeelibyan,” 
June 23, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwsNjwqgp2E
110  Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 150.
111  Ibid., 148.
112  DERNA PROTESTERS FIGHTING SNIPERS WITH ROCKS, YouTube video, 0:52, posted by “ibnomar2005,” 
february 17, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2gsf5l2bfNQ
113  Paul Schemm, “Battle of Benghazi: how Protesters Seized the City,” NBC News. February 26, 2011.  
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protesters.114 Youths were not the only ones to stand up against the regime. Lawyers and judges
demanded  the  formation  of  a  new  constitution.115 Although  the  security  forces  and  financial
resources were controlled outside of the formal state structure, the fact that the Gaddafi-regime was
having problems within its formal state structure was a worrying sign. 
Gaddafi  had  sent  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  General  Abdel  Fatah  Younis  Al-Obeidi  to
Benghazi with a contingent of special forces to relieve the embattled garrison. Instead of doing this,
Younis  gave  the  remaining  loyalists  the  chance  to  flee  the  city,  and  by  the  20 th of  February,
Benghazi's military garrison had either fled or sided with the protesters.116 In Misrata  protesters
controlled the streets, Libya's third-largest city, situated between Tripoli and Gaddafi's hometown
and stronghold Sirte.117 In Tripoli itself, protesters marched on Tripoli's Green Square and attacked
government  buildings.118 On  the  22nd,  General  Abdel  Fatah  Younis  Al-Obeidi  gave  a  televised
statement,  in  which  he  resigned  from  his  position  and  declared  his  allegiance  to  the
revolutionaries.119 Not only was he a prominent member of Libya's security apparatus, nor just a
leading regime figure in the informal state structure, but he was also a founding member of the
Revolutionary Command Council. This shows that Gaddafi's coalition management, essential for
the functioning of the informal state structure, was failing, as prominent regime figures, diplomats
and military personnel defected. 
One  of  Gaddafi's  sons,  Saif  al-Islam,  who  did  not  hold  a  position  in  the  formal  state
structure, gave a televised statement in which he blamed foreign powers on the unrest, as well as
114 ةقزترم ىفاذقلا ىف ىزاغنب 17 2 11  Yellow Hats, YouTube video, 0:21, posted by “freeeeelibyan,” June 11, 2011, 
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benghazi-how-protesters-seized-city/
117  Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 150.
118  Ibid.
119  Libyan interior minister resigns, YouTube video, 0:48, posted by “Al Jazeera English,” February 22, 2011,  
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mistakes made by the army and police.120 He stated that continued protests would lead to chaos and
war.121 On the 21st, Gaddafi dispelled rumors that he had fled to Venezuela, in a televised clip of 22
seconds.122 The footage showed that it was shot in the Bab al-Aziziya complex in Tripoli. With the
state  falling  apart,  and  the  informal  power  structure  cracking,  it  could  have  been  of  critical
importance to show loyalist forces that Gaddafi had not fled. The next day, Gaddafi gave a one-and-
a-half hour televised speech from the same place, with the sculpture of a golden fist clenching an
American fighter jet  featuring prominently in view of the camera.  Labeled by commentators as
bizarre, this speech contained an important message.123 Gaddafi ended the speech with words that
would be repeated around the world. Gaddafi blamed foreign powers, such as Qatar, for the unrest
and stated that he would lead a march that would purify Libya 'inch by inch, house by house, street
by street, person by person'.124 The last words were: 'Its the time to work, its time to march, its time
to triumph, no going back, to the front'.125 This message is not as bizarre as commentators made it
out to be. Just days into the unrest, Gaddafi draws a clear line that his regime will do anything to
regain control, and that retreat is not an option. 
Gaddafi addressed a crowd of supporters at Tripoli's Green Square on the 25th of February.
In this speech, he spoke of arming the population and that Libya would burn.126 Gaddafi's use of
informal power provided the means to strike back. Taylor describes how Gaddafi  and his inner
120  Al Jazeera English - Saif El Islam Gadaffi addresses the nation - Part 1 of 3, YouTube video, 14:48, posted by 
“bokaal2,” February 20, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eL6I5hktEs0
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rN0AqeMedWc
123  John Hudson,, “Qaddafi's Most Bizarre Moments in a Bizarre Speech,” The Wire. February 22, 2011.    
http://www.thewire.com/global/2011/02/qaddafi-s-most-bizarre-moments-in-a-bizarre-speech/21022/
124  Muammar Gaddafi speech TRANSLATED (2011 Feb 22), YouTube video, 3:56, posted by “SLOBoe,” February 
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circle assessed the defections and forces opposed to their regime, and set out to consolidate what
forces they could muster, convening tribal meetings and mobilizing loyalist forces in Tripoli and
Sirte.127 Lacher describes that the weakness of the state institutions were to blame for their rapid
disintegration, but also that these institutions fell apart along tribal lines, with some siding with the
revolution.128 Al Jazeera broadcast recordings of phone calls between top Libyan regime figures that
showed this process of coalition management. In the recordings, Gaddafi himself, Saif al-Islam,
Prime Minister al-Baghdadi and others discussed the necessity of maintaining the allegiance of
certain tribes, which tribes remained loyal, which tribes the regime needed to regain full control, as
well as the importance of Gaddafi's sons Khamis and Mutassim as military commanders.129 With the
formal state structure fractured, the regime fell back on patrimonial networks, which was possible
due to control over the budget and security forces being placed in the informal power structure.
A ragtag rebel force from Benghazi advanced westward from along the populated coast.
Swarms of Toyota pick-up trucks with mounted heavy weapons moved through town after town.130
Disorganized  and chaotic,  the  performance of  this  improvised  army showed no signs  of  being
skilled in the art of warfare.131 Any rebel advance turned into a headlong retreat when missiles,
artillery or air force jets struck near their position.132 In addition to Al-Bayda, Derna, Tobruk and
Benghazi, the sheer size of the rebel army and the dismal state of loyalist forces led to the rebels
127  Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 150.
128  Wolfram Lacher, “Families, Tribes and Cities During the Libyan Revolution,” Middle East Policy 18 no. 4  (2011):
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advance through Ajdabiya, Brega, Ras Lanuf and Bin Jawad.133 The next town on this route was
Gaddafi's  hometown and support  base  of  Sirte.  In  western  Libya,  protesters  and defectors  had
seized  control  of  Misrata,  situated  between  Sirte  and Tripoli.134 According  to  Brahimi,  Libya's
division between formal and informal power structures, and the tribal relations that were part of the
informal power structure, was responsible for the loss of control in such a short period of time, but
that this system also provided Gaddafi with the opportunity to use coercive power from through
informal power structures.135
After securing Tripoli  by force, Gaddafi  counter-attacked. The Gaddafi-regime employed
assets that were still  at  their  disposal,  such as Libya's  air  force,  remnants of the regular armed
forces, and the elite 32nd Reinforced Brigade, led by Gaddafi's son Khamis, and supplemented by
mercenaries  and  irregular  forces.  The  32nd Reinforced  Brigade  attacked  Zawiya,  on  the  2nd of
March.136 At the same time, loyalist forces attacked Misrata, and the eastern towns of Ras Lanuf and
Brega.137 The  disorganized  rebels  did  not  stand a  chance  against  the  heavy  weaponry  used  by
Gaddafi's forces. After a string of victories, Gaddafi-forces advanced with tanks into the city centers
of Misrata and Benghazi on the 16th of March.138 This use of coercive power was possible due to the
absence of restraint for the regime by state institutions, a result of the division between formal and
informal power structures. According to Lacher, only the security forces centered around Gaddafi
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mattered.139
This turnaround of events shows the regime's adaptiveness to shifts in the first, second and
third dimensions of Schlumberger's framework, namely, state-society relations, the features of the
political regimes and the military. Heydemann's assertion that the durability of Arab authoritarian
regime rests with the extent to which the regime can adapt to shifts in the national-populist social
pacts, shows that Libya's absence of institutionalized political opposition and the non-existence of
other  forms  of  grassroots  organization,  resulted  in  the  regime  proving  adaptable  to  the  crisis,
because  of  the  division  between  informal  and  formal  power  structures  in  Libya's  system  of
governance.140 Sluglett's emphasis on democratic rituals became irrelevant, as protesters demanded
the downfall of the regime.141 Lawson's assertion on the corporate autonomy of the armed forces,
also became irrelevant in assessing the durability of Gaddafi's regime.142 As stated by Droz-Vincent,
the lack of commitment of the regular armed forces to the regime can be explained through their
absence in the economy.143 However, in Libya's system, the army was so weak that the regime could
not effectively employ it, or count on its loyalty, but at the same time, the regular armed forces were
not strong enough to defeat the regime. Although shifts in these dimensions played a role in the
country falling apart, this constellation of forces made it that the regime was able to use coercive
power to regain control, because this coercive power was rooted in the informal power structure.
Libya's  system of  governance,  with  its  division  between  formal  and informal  power,  with  the
revenues of natural resources and control over the security forces vested in the informal power
structure, made it that the formal power structure was not in a position to threaten the system of
governance, or constrain the use of coercive power by the informal power structure. In addition to
139  Lacher, “Families, Tribes and Cities During the Libyan Revolution,” 140. 
140  Heydemann, “Social Pacts,” 26.
141  Sluglett, “The Ozymandias Syndrome,” 102.
142  Lawson, “Intraregime Dynamics,” 110.
143  Droz-Vincent, “From Political to Economic Actors,” 203.
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this, according to Heydemann, a regime's durability hinges on its ability to restructure its security
forces and adapt its security tactics, in order to deal with large-scale civil unrest and the ensuing
armed  insurrection.144 Control  of  these  revenues,  as  well  as  the  patrimonial  character  of  state
institutions, are what Bellin describes as crucial  elements for the state to retain its capacity for
coercive power.145 Gaddafi's regime was able to fall back on an inner circle, and restructured the
security forces to use coercive power against the threat it faced. 
The  international  community  condemned  Gaddafi's  use  of  force.  The  Arab  League  had
suspended Libya from its meetings on the 23rd of February.146 On the 27th, President Obama called
for Gaddafi  to  step down and leave Libya,  stating that  Gaddafi  had lost  the legitimacy to rule
Libya.147 This refers to the level of coercive power the regime employed from within the informal
power structure. Just as the protests and violence spiraled out of control, so did Libya's position in
the  international  community.  The  fourth  dimension  of  Schlumberger's  framework  shifted,  as
opposed  to  Sayyid's  and  Brownlee's  assumptions  that  the  international  community  lacked  the
commitment  to  promote  democracy  or  restrain  coercive  power.148 In  addition  to  many  states
condemning Gaddafi's use of force, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1970,
imposing sanctions  on Libya  that  included an  arms embargo and freezing Libyan assets.149 As
Gaddafi  loyalists  were  close  to  victory  in  Misrata  and  Benghazi,  the  United  Nations  Security
Council adopted Resolution 1973 on the 17th of March.150 This Resolution imposed a no-fly zone
144  Heydemann “Syria's Adaptive Authoritarianism,” 
145  Eva Bellin “Coercive Institutions.” 21.
146  “Arab league Suspends Libya Until demands of the People are Met,” BBC. February 23, 2011.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/2011/02/110223_libya_arableague_focus.shtml
147  “Obama: Gaddafi Must Leave Libya Now,” BBC. February 23, 2011.    
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2011/02/2011226232530835912.html
148  Sayyid, “The International Dimension of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism ,” 43.
149  UNSC Resolution 1970,  http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm
150  UNSC Resolution 1973, http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm
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over Libya and allowed for any necessary measure to protect civilians. Pro-Gaddafi forces were
bombed in Benghazi and Misrata, the road leading to Benghazi was littered with bombed military
hardware.151 Governmental and military infrastructure was targeted. Libya's air force, air-defense
capabilities and naval forces were destroyed.152 
Marsh states that the reasoning for the military intervention in Libya is best explained from a
realist perspective. The Obama-administration determined that the unrest in Libya threatened the
interests of the United States. A conflict in Libya, and continuing instability due to the regime's
response could destabilize the Middle East and harm the economic and security interests of the
United States and certain European states.153 Other explanations from a realist perspective could
include a fear of Gaddafi returning to anti-Western policies, as he had proved capable of adapting
his  claims  to  sources  of  nondemocratic  legitimacy  through  shifts  in  his  domestic  and  foreign
policies, and of the regime's durability, despite having been isolated in the international community
in the past. In response to international pressure, Gaddafi blamed Al-Qaeda for the uprising and
portrayed the image of Libya as a democracy, wherein he himself did not have an official position,
and thus could not resign.154 Through this, Gaddafi tried to construct an image of the conflict where,
through a realist perspective, the crackdown was necessary to maintain stability in Libya and to
combat Al-Qaeda. When including constructivism and liberalism, as Davidson does, it adds to the
realist  perspective  that  the  intervening  states  responded  to  Gaddafi's  crackdown  by  invoking
collectively held humanitarian norms, threats to national interests, prestige, and the minimization of
151  Gaddafi convoy bombed outside benghazi 19 3 11, YouTube video, 2:39, posted by “freeeeelibyan,” July 20, 2011, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1_QBS_I06Q; International forces bombard targets in Libya - 19 March, 2011,
YouTube video, 2:21, posted by “FauzinfoVids,” March 19, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=9nYWVco6KJA
152 Victoria Ward, “Libya: Gaddafi's Air Force Has Been destroyed,” Telegraph. March 23, 2011.    
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8402281/Libya-Gaddafis-air-force-has-
been-destroyed.html; “Libyan Ships destroyed in Attack by RAF Jets,” Telegraph. May 20, 2011.      
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electoral risk, as the factors that led to the intervention.155 A diplomat who was present during the
negotiations remarked that the states pushing for Resolution 1973, stated that an intervention was
deemed necessary to prevent a bloodbath in Benghazi.156 The actions of the Libyan regime were
constructed as having diminished the legitimacy of the Gaddafi-regime to rule Libya through the
violation  of  collectively  held  norms.  Whether  from  a  realist  or  constructivist  perspective,  the
adaptive  capacity  of  the  regime  to  counter  the  uprising  were  initially  successful,  but  this
adaptability, and the tactics employed, resulted in the international community to intervene.
The  NATO-air  campaign  and  support  for  the  rebels  spelled  the  death  sentence  of  the
Gaddafi-regime.157 The 'Guide  of  the  Revolution'  eventually  made a  desperate  last  stand in  his
hometown of Sirte. Surrounded from all sides, NATO-forces bombed his convoy while trying to
flee the city.158 The dictator, who had taken on superpowers, was dragged from a drainage pipe,
mobbed and lynched.159
12. Conclusion
The Libyan case shows the importance of informal power structures in times of crisis for the
durability of an authoritarian regime. Gaddafi had ruled Libya for 42 years when the Arab Spring
erupted. Within days after the protests started, Libya experienced a collapse of the regular armed
forces, disintegration of formal state institutions, defections of regime-insiders, and condemnation
155  Jason W. Davidson, “Britain, France and the Intervention in Libya,” 312-314.
156  Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, “Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in 
Libya,” European Journal of International Relations  20 (4), (2014): 901, accessed February 28, 2015.
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by the international community.  Gaddafi adapted to the situation and rallied his forces.
The Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constituted a system of governance
that was unique in its kind. The regime's system of governance  Gaddafi's domestic and foreign
policies provided various sources of nondemocratic legitimacy. During its reign, the regime proved
adaptable to changes within Libya, as well as to changes in the international landscape, and proved
able to shift its policies to pursue other sources of nondemocratic legitimacy. The formal political
system, based on Gaddafi's  Green Book, and the informal power structure that Gaddafi created,
maintained Gaddafi's regime during his 42-year rule. The features of this political system, the role
of the armed forces and formal institutions, the absence of institutionalized political opposition and
grassroots organizations, all contributed to the longevity of Gaddafi's rule. The division of formal
and  informal  power,  placed  the  economy  and  the  security  services  within  the  informal  power
structure. This constellation of forces rooted the monopoly on maintaining patrimonial networks,
and the coercive power of the state, within the informal power structure. The regime was able to fall
back on these patrimonial networks and Gaddafi's immediate family to quell the unrest, whereby the
formal power structure was marginalized. This use of informal power nearly secured a victory over
insurrectionist forces.
Gaddafi's regime proved adaptable to shifts in the dimensions of Schlumberger's framework
during the initial phase of the uprising. The case that this thesis has made, is that this adaptability,
through the use of informal power structures,  made it  possible for the regime to almost regain
control during the uprising, but also led to a military intervention from which the regime could not
recover. This duality of informal power was underrepresented in Schlumberger's framework.
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